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COMMUNICATIONOn procedural discoursivation – or how
local utterances are turned into binding facts
Thomas Scheﬀer
Emmy-Noether Group ‘‘Comparative Micro-Sociology of Criminal Proceedings’’,
Altensteinstrasse 2-4, 14195 Berlin, GermanyAbstract
The article deals with a fundamental mechanism here referred to as ‘discoursivation’ meaning the
transformation of local utterances into available and binding discursive facts. Discoursivation, it is
claimed, lies at the heart of (legal) discourse formation since it provides the basic material for all the
operations to follow such as deﬁning, assessing, and deciding. The basic mechanism is explored in
light of two models: Luhmann’s ‘‘procedural past’’ and Foucault’s ‘‘ﬁeld of presence’’. Do these
models grasp the mechanism of discoursivation? Three criminal cases provide the empirical reference
for the conceptual endeavour. In each of these cases, the analysis traces the suspect’s early defence
and the multiple reappearances and references to it in the procedural course. On these grounds, the
article distinguishes three modes of discoursivation. Utterances are turned into discursive facts by
ways of staging, reiteration, and mobilisation. By using only one of these modes, an analysis of legal
discourse unavoidably mistakes the subject- and power-position of the contributor vis-a`-vis the
procedure.
 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction
This article is about the temporal formation of legal discourses and about the momen-
tousness and the limitation of this formation. Legal discourses – here taken as legal pro-
cedures – are presented as forceful socio-material processes that are capable of making local
utterances available for eﬀectual discursive operations. To put it diﬀerently, utterances are0271-5309/$ - see front matter  2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.langcom.2006.07.001
E-mail address: Scheﬀer@law-in-action.org
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on the following contributions. Discursive facts equip the procedural publics to tell apart
coherent from incoherent, credible from incredible, beneﬁcial from harmful contributions.
How does the transformation from the local to the translocal unit, from the interactional
to the processual unit, from the ephemeral to the lasting unit take place? Answers, natu-
rally, are partial and preliminary. They will satisfy fully neither theoretical nor empirical
discourse analytical scholars. However, the aim of this article is to merely establish a prob-
lematic and to provide some tools, perspectives, and hypotheses to dwell on.
The distinction of local utterances and discursive facts marks an important diﬀerence to
conventional discourse analyses. Usually everything that surfaces is considered as being
already part of the discourse under study. Every expression, let it be oral or written, is
taken as an articulation or even citation of the focal discourse. Utterances are analysed
as being always already positioned right ‘inside’ the discourse. Instead, I suggest a
multi-dimensional perspective on (legal) discourse formation. I identify the availability
and binding of utterances as the basic task to be accomplished for all practical purposes.2
The ‘discoursivation’ of utterances, meaning their transformation into fully available con-
tributions, is necessary for legal discourses to employ their powerful operations. In return,
I suppose that not everything uttered is exposed to the hegemonic discourse. Not every-
thing can be utilised later on. Not everything will be binding or, what is more, damaging
for the one who ‘said so’.
In the following, I ask accordingly: how are local utterances turned into discursive facts
to be available and relevant for procedural events such as plea bargaining sessions or trial
hearings? I launch two rather abstract models, before I oﬀer some case stories collected
during my long-term ﬁeldwork in English Crown Courts: Luhmann’s concept of the ‘‘pro-
cedural history’’ and Foucault’s notion of the ‘‘ﬁeld of presence’’. Both suggest general
answers to our enquiry on discoursivation. Additionally, I introduce two methodical
devices that link up the three case stories and the analytical scope of this exploration:
the trans-sequential analysis and the analysis of co-productive and preset materialities.
Both, the mechanisms to be discussed and the methods to be applied, should shed some
light on the focal concern: in what ways and to what eﬀects are past utterances turned into
available and binding facts?
1.1. Full availability: Luhmann’s ‘‘procedural past’’
Luhmann (1989) presents one general answer to our question. The past is present in
procedural events by means of what he described as ‘‘procedural history’’. Luhmann
referred to this concept as a core mechanism that can explain the triumph of legal proce-
dures over the individual contestants. Simply put, Luhmann’s model works like this: some-
thing is more or less carelessly uttered at an early stage and turns into a binding version in
due course.1 I use the two notions synonymously in order to refer to the elementary units of legal discourse. Statements,
thus, is not primarily used in the mundane judicial sense of ‘giving a statement’.
2 The similar task could be identiﬁed for scientiﬁc, political, or even private discourses. The availability of
utterances is closely related to the often discussed question of accountability. Broader concepts such as
authorship, proof, or the person are of relevance to organise availability.
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munication, even the unintended presentation that contributes to the proceeding, counts
as information that opens, thickens and excludes opportunities that deﬁne the acting per-
sons and their relevant history and reduces their options to decide. Every contribution
enters the procedural history and can be reinterpreted but not neglected.’ Luhmann names
a number of preconditions for this forceful mechanism to work: the contributor can decide
freely amongst several options (no torture!); he/she is accountable for the decisions taken
(no insanity!); the outcome of the contest remains open until the end (no preliminary
decision!).
Early contributions turn into binding norms, into robust criteria to probe and assess
what will be entered later to the ‘same issue’. Notice that what is ‘at issue’ is co-constructed
by the very same movement of transformation and accumulation. This binding describes
the core mechanism of legal discourses: the contestants, once they start engaging with the
proceeding, get entangled with their own choices. Options get blocked because of the par-
ticipant’s self-involvement. Luhmann’s procedure takes the shape of a selective and inte-
grated ‘funnel’ (Luhmann, 1989)3:
(3) C’’
(2) B’ C’
(1) A B C D
The options available are reduced from stage to stage. What seems a relatively free
choice at the start (1), and a matter of strategy halfway through (2), turns into a restriction
at the closing stages (3). The procedural past is binding owing to the norms of consistency.
Binding, however, does not mean that the past determines the presence. It restricts and
guides any later representation of the case.3 Lu
‘At th
Oxford‘The participants (. . .) try regularly to attach a new past to their own case. While try-
ing to do so, they get unexpectedly entangled with what is transformed into the pro-
cedural history and what now increasingly restricts their options in due course.
Everybody, thus, who wants to develop mastery in the art of the procedure, must
learn to control two pasts simultaneously.’ (my own translation, Luhmann, 1989
[1976], p. 44)1.2. The confrontation of scattered statements: Foucault’s ‘‘ﬁelds of presence’’
In order to spell out the operation of the procedural past, one can employ Foucault’s
idea of the ‘ﬁeld of presence (by which is understood all statements formulated elsewherehmann’s idea of a funnel as temporal division of labour contradicts the common understanding of trials:
e trial all issues of law and fact arising in the case will be determined.’ (A concise Dictionary of Law,
, 1983)
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judged, as well as those that are rejected and excluded)’ (Foucault, 2003 [1972], p. 64).
The ‘‘ﬁeld of presence’’ can be imagined as the translocal coexistence of interrelated state-
ments.4 It can be imagined as the vibrant constellation of relatively young and old state-
ments. The constellation is shaken by and shapes newly entered statements. I graphically
imagine this formation like this:
New contributions meet the already existing relation of statements that each feature
diﬀerent ages and origins. The meaning of the contribution is ‘decided’ for now by the rela-
tion entered. Meaning is not connected to propositions or sentences, but to the ever-
changing links between statements within the dynamic ﬁeld of presence. Meaning is
neither imagined as moving from the inside of the author to her outside. Meaning is rather
an eﬀect of these ﬁelds in formation. Meaning itself is in formation.
At this point, it may be helpful to introduce a basic distinction that can be found in
Foucault as well. Foucault, in his analysis of the (temporal) ‘‘formation of discourse’’,
gradually distinguishes formulations in terms of their spatiotemporal expansion. Not
every utterance works outside the moments of its emergence. Not every word stirs and
shakes the wider net of coexisting statements. There is a certain materiality (steadiness)
and mediality (circulation) necessary to run an extended discourse. Discursive units vary
in the ways they survive, circulate, and interrelate.
In this line, Foucault diﬀerentiates utterances and statements. While the ﬁrst are units
of everyday conversation, the latter are units of powerful hegemonic discourses. Utter-
ances are, like their hosting discourses, local and momentary (often misleadingly called
‘‘natural’’ or ‘‘informal’’).5 Similar to the procedural successions, statements or discursive
facts are translocal and lasting. Utterances drive conversations, while statements drive,
e.g., legal processes. For Foucault, this distinction is not absolute, but relative:4 Fo
quite d
(statem
truth o
5 See
taken
this re‘In short, I suspect one could ﬁnd a kind of gradation between diﬀerent types of dis-
course within most societies: discourse ‘uttered’ in the course of the day and in casual
meetings, and which disappears with the very act which gave rise to it; and thoseucault names other forms of coexistence: ‘a ﬁeld of concomitance (this includes statements that concern
iﬀerent domains of objects, and belong to quite diﬀerent types of discourse . . .)’ and ‘a ﬁeld of memory
ents that are no longer accepted or discussed, and which consequently no longer deﬁne either a body of
r a domain of validity . . .)’ (Foucault, 2003, p. 64).
for the ground-breaking study of naturally occurring utterances within talk, Sacks (1992). His studies were
up by Ethnomethological scholars and their transcript driven conversation analyses. As the classic text in
alm, see Sacks et al. (1974).
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T. Scheﬀer / Language & Communication 27 (2007) 1–27 5forms of discourse that lie at the origins of a certain number of verbal acts, which are
reiterated, transformed or discussed (. . .)’ (Foucault, 2003, p. 220)For our purposes, the gradual distinction can explicate the direction and eﬃcacy of
discoursivation.
Local
! TranslocalEmbodied utterancench (1999) introduces the various relations of archive and history from a sociolo
without the archive, one may recapitulate. There is, however, a rising signiﬁcanc
of writing history. See for Ethnomethodological studies that follow the natives’ mo
immerman (1969) and Smith (1985, 2000).
ain Foucault: ‘I reject a uniform model of temporalization, in order to describ
e, its rules of accumulation, exclusion, reactivation, its own forms of derivation, an
ion over various successions.’ (Foucault, 2003, p. 221).
r Foucault, every statement is trans-sequential. It ‘is linked not only to the situations
sequences that gives rise to, but at the same time, and in accordance with a quite diﬀ
ents that precede and follow it.’ (Foucault, 2003, p. 31) We use the utterance-statem
s concurrence empirically.Legal statement
 Contribution to talk
 Short lived Discursive fact
 Proc. historyDiscourse formation involves this meticulous and inconspicuous mechanism: the trans-
formation of utterances into statements. The reader might imagine a suspect being con-
fronted with unpleasant questions by the police. No matter the extent to which they are
stipulated by local inﬂuences, her responses are recorded, documented and circulated
‘on paper’. They are systematically made available for the prosecution (case). But the clo-
ser examination of the creation of history shows that discoursivation is not reducible to
documentary practices.6 There are more ways to guide utterances into the procedure.
So far and in light of Foucault’s ‘‘gradation’’ one can spell out some notes of caution
in regard to Luhmann’s ‘‘procedural past’’: not everything expressed is available in due
course; the availability is itself a practical accomplishment; the discourse formation rests
on certain socio-material arrangements.
1.3. Accounting for multiple temporalizations
In the following, I focus on one procedural regime to examine the discoursivation of
early defences: the pre-trial and trial of English Crown Courts. My argument sets oﬀ with
the following reservations: Crown Court procedures do not progress in just one space-
time; statements are not integrated in just one transparent discursive ﬁeld; procedural
pasts are not piled up just in the course of the pre-trial. Rather than of a single succession
that could be traced from start to end, the legal procedure includes several interruptions
and ‘‘multiple temporalizations’’.7
As the empirical method to trace and link up ‘‘multiple temporalizations’’, I propose a
‘‘trans-sequential analysis’’ (Scheﬀer, 2004, 2005a, 2005, 2006). Trans-sequential analysis
accounts for becomings and their various appearances. It presumes that contributions
to one situation trigger systematic eﬀects on a bigger scale.8 For instance, ‘‘doinggical perspective. No
e of witnessing in new
vements from talk to
e, for each discursive
d its speciﬁc modes of
that provoke it, and to
erent modality, to the
ent distinction to open
6 T. Scheﬀer / Language & Communication 27 (2007) 1–27interview’’ is coupled in various ways to ‘‘doing procedure’’.9 The following diagram sug-
gests a straightforward coupling of event and procedure:Procedural course 
Procedural events 
Trans-sequentiality accounts for the two temporalities or courses of legal discourse: the
procedural course is fed with discursive facts that derive from preceding events. The events
are ‘‘structurally coupled’’ (Luhmann) with the procedural course and gain relevant orien-
tation and resources from it. Procedural events, in this view, are guided but not deter-
mined. They are bounded, but not preset.
In this line, the study of legal discourses requires at least two methodical scopes: Firstly,
it requires a focus on co-presence in order to account for the unique events and the embod-
ied contributions; the inquiry secondly requires access to the legal process by means of the
usually employed media such as the archive and the ﬁle. But does this two-step suﬃce to
actually grasp legal discourse formation?
1.4. Towards a temporal understanding of materiality
The coupling of events and the criminal process rests on a whole range of materialities
that enact continuation despite disruption, process despite containment, stability despite
change. The materialities expand the temporal scope of procedural events without substi-
tuting them. The events still need to take place as something that has not been there
before. Materialities do not replace but allow the singularity of the event.
Commonly, the noun ‘‘legal materiality’’ refers to substantial things such as documents,
ﬁles, archives, courtrooms, law books etc. Temporally understood, materialities are – from
the point of view of any current encounter – ‘material’ to various degrees and therefore
provide diﬀerent degrees of stability and elasticity. They trigger continuation by not being
fully included in any of the procedural events. They are in fact a-synchronic becomings
that are in diﬀerent ways un/available for local manipulations and adjustments.10 For9 For an example of the use of discursive facts in the courtroom, see Benson and Drew (1978). For the use of
discursive facts in political debates, see Antaki and Leudar (2001). Lynch and Bogen (1996) use the notion of
‘‘documentary method of interrogation’’ to describe the reference to facts in the Iran-Contra hearings. One can
summarise that all utilisations are necessarily interpretative and selective. They ascribe a certain meaning to the
mobilised portion of the document – and render it relevant to the current dealings (see Smith, 1974).
10 This concept of materiality refers back to Durkheim’s (1982, p. 51) deﬁnition of ‘‘the social fact’’. For him
social facts ‘possess the remarkable property of existing outside the consciousness of the individual (. . .) whether
he wishes it or not, they impose themselves upon him’. I understand materialities of discourse analogously as
exceeding the space-time of face-to-face interaction. Things are ‘material’ for the interaction thanks to their
separate modes of becoming: like the drafting of a document (that can not be talked out of existence), the
compiling of a ﬁle (that can not be amended by way of talking), or the trained body (that can not be talked into
existence). Due to this separation, materialities turn into essential co-producers of the hearings.
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ential: to interactively accomplish court hearings, for instance, does not mean that every-
thing derives from the situation or is locally produced by its participants.
Commonly, materiality is conceptualised as stable and robust, as being in place like an
infrastructure or as being in circulation like documents. It is imagined as taking space, or
reaching out. Especially the latter – being here and there by means of circulation – was pro-
ductive in dealingwith themicro–macro problem.Material things helped to explain the inte-
gration, stabilisation, and control of wide territories. In addition to this spatial
understanding of materiality, I propose a temporal one.11 In the temporal version, the micro
and the macro are linked in terms of integrating past and future into the present course. Sev-
eral irreversible pasts and anticipated futures are (made) available to the current dealings.
There is another aspect that marks the diﬀerence between spatial and temporal founda-
tions of materiality. In the spatial version, things are not just turned into immutable
beings; spatiality also ascribes stable qualities to these things. An identity is inscribed into
the thing in the way that readings are inscribed into texts. Where do these inscriptions
derive from? In the spatial version, material things – tools, technologies, or machines –
appear as upshots of (intentional) design projects.12 The inscriptions can store the strate-
gies of their founders. Material things enable engineers and machinists to ‘‘act over dis-
tances’’ (Latour, 1987).
The temporal understanding of materiality does not deny strategic inscriptions, but
makes their durability and practicality an empirical issue. The trans-sequential analysis
includes the process and working of materialities. It accounts for their distinct rhythms
of ‘‘continuous coming to be and passing away’’ (Turetzky, 1998, p. 104): a number of seats
in the traditional Crown Courts, for instance, are not in use anymore; phrases in law
books are overwritten or disarmed by later ‘‘authorities’’; stories are forgotten or out of
use. Considering these displacements, one may follow Foucault and his idea of discourse
formation: new statements do not just pile up on top of the stored past. They rather keep
the whole formation ‘awake’. A single statement may be capable of disturbing what had
been ‘once and for all’ ﬁled: ‘the archive never sleeps.’
In the following, I present three cases that show the binding forces of the procedural
past in various ways. On this basis, I discuss three modes of transforming utterances into
statements.
2. Three stories on binding eﬀects
In the following, I brieﬂy present three diﬀerent Crown Court cases. The three cases
derive from extended ethnographic ‘‘law in action’’ ﬁeldwork13 in small law ﬁrms and bar-
risters’ Chambers in Northern England. The case histories introduce diﬀerent variants of
discoursivation. They broaden the view on the various relations of utterances and state-
ments. The stories set oﬀ with the early defences presented by the suspects in their police
interviews. The suspects’ responses give rise to the following speciﬁcations: only a few turn11 The temporal foundation of materiality is informed by Bergson (1889/1910) followed by Deleuze (1991). For
an analytical speciﬁcation see Scheﬀer (2004). For an empirical application see Scheﬀer (2006).
12 In this line, Hirschauer (2004) claims that post-humanist ANT is rooted in a human centred action-paradigm.
Capable actors develop things in order to act upon the world. These things transport their founders’ strategies.
13 A concise overview on law in action research is provided by Travers and Manzo (1997) and Travers (1997).
8 T. Scheﬀer / Language & Communication 27 (2007) 1–27into discursive facts; only some are made available; only certain ones trigger binding
eﬀects. The case histories report on how utterances reappear, how some are strategically
developed, and how they are pushed into the limelight of the open court.
The three cases derive from, what I call, the ‘‘Crown Court regime’’. This procedural
regime is characterised by an extended pre-trial that invites independent inquiries by the
adversaries into the matter. It furthermore invites the step-by-step separation of agreed-
upon and debated issues, resolutions outside court by means of plea bargaining, and, if
necessary, a detailed and agreed-upon choreography for the days in court. Crown Court
cases arrive from lower Magistrates Courts, where they are usually heard by three lay
judges assisted by one legally educated clerk. Cases are delegated to the higher Crown
Court because of three reasons: (1) the oﬀence is triable only on indictment (such as mur-
der, manslaughter, rape, and wounding with intent); (2) the defendant of an ‘oﬀence tri-
able either way’ chooses the trial by jury14; (3) the Magistrates decide that the
maximum adequate penalty exceeds their powers.15
The investigation into the matter begins with the police. Police oﬃcers gather evidence.
The main occasion to collect (early) accounts of what ‘really happened’ is the police inter-
view. Here, the ‘victim’, the ‘suspect’, and the ‘eyewitnesses’ are questioned ﬁrst (see Innes,
2003). The case is brought to Magistrates Court not by the police but by the Crown Pros-
ecution Service. The CPS must convince the Magistrates that there is in fact a triable case.
Some matters include a defence or explanation by the accused already at this early stage.
2.1. The 1st case: repeating the early defence
The ﬁrst case chosen here resembles a simple and unproblematic matter – at least in
technical terms. It deals with a battering that allegedly took place in a night club. The
man arrested on the scene was interviewed by two police oﬃcers the morning after. The
following play of question and answer enters the interview protocol. Interviewers and
interviewee co-produce to diﬀerent degrees16 the following ‘early’ account as a protocol
text. The client’s answers are accentuated by dint of capital letters:PC14 This c
deception
judge doe
jurisdictio
15 Accor
6 months
16 They
process, w
practicesWhat’s happened last night?
Client WELL I WAS OUT WITH MY BROTHER AND HIS MATER IN A
NIGHTCLUB. JUST COMING BACK FROM THE TOILET, THIS GUY
BUMPED INTO ME, SO I TURNED ROUND AND SAID, ‘‘SORRY,’’
AND HE JUST PUSHED ME . . . THEN I STARTED CALLING
HIM . . . I DON’T KNOW EXACTLY WHAT I WAS CALLING HIM,
‘‘DICKHEAD;’’ . . . ‘‘FAGGOT.’’ategory includes oﬀences of intermediate seriousness, such as theft, handling stolen goods, obtaining by
, or burglary. The client faces a tricky decision: while the jury is more likely to acquit, the Crown Court
s enter a higher sentence in case of a guilty verdict. For the career of the jury concept in the English
n, see Lloyd-Bostock and Thomas (1999).
ding to the Magistrates’ Courts Act 1980 the maximum imprisonment is in summary oﬀences up to
. The maximum aggregate term is up to 12 months.
contribute to the record in diﬀerent ways. The interviewee is generally separated from the writing
hile the police oﬃcer speaks the protocol into his Dictaphone. See for a close analysis of documentation
(Scheﬀer, 1998).
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ations is rHe was calling you?
Client NO, I WAS CALLING HIM THAT . . . COS I THOUGHT THERE WAS
NO NEED FOR PUSHING ME . . . COS I APOLIGISED . . . AND
THEN HE CAME UP TO ME, PUNCHED ME, I FELL ON THE FLOOR,
AND THEN HIM AND THIS OTHER LAD STARTED STAMPING ON ME.
I HAD ME DRINK IN ME HAND, SO WHEN I GOT UP IT WAS
EMPTY, SO I JUST HIT HIM WITH IT. I GOT THE CHANCE TO GET
UP AND THEN I JUST HIT HIM WITH IT.PC When you say ‘‘hit him with it,’’ what do you mean by that?
Client WELL, I HAD IT IN ME HAND AND I JUST SMACKED IT IN HIS FACE:
PC That’s your right hand, is it?
Client ME RIGHT HAND.
PC . . .What was it? A bottle? A glass?
Client IT WAS A GLASS, IT WASN’T A BOTTLE.According to the protocol ‘‘our client’’ stated that he was provoked and even
attacked ﬁrst. ‘His’ documented version of ‘‘what happened’’ strings together various
details and aspects: what kind of glass it was; where he hit him; what happened
after; whether he regrets it, etc. The protocol became the reference point for further
operations in the procedural course: the defence barrister uses it to take instructions
from his client; the two barristers quote it during their plea bargaining session; the
defence barrister uses the protocol to lead his ‘only witness’ (the defendant) through
the ‘coherent’ testimony; the prosecuting barrister quotes it during his cross-
examination.
How does this ﬁrst defence relate to the account oﬀered months later in court? How
is the testimony diﬀerent considering the fact that the early version was generated
under diﬀerent circumstances? In court, there are no police oﬃcers asking unwelcome
questions. There is no hangover causing distress. The former anger and rage vanished.
This time, the defendant’s account is initiated by the ‘‘friendly examination’’ in front of
judge, jury and opponent. This time, it is his defence barrister who guides him through
the account.17
Despite these diverse circumstances, the storyline accompanied by some details
reappears. The account seems surprisingly stable. The testimony in court unfolds like
this:Q. And how long were you on the ﬂoor for, could you say? – A. About a minute.
Q. And who was involved in the stamping and kicking? – A. Jonathan Victim and his
friend, the blonde one.
Q. What happened then? – A. Well then, after they had been stamping on me, I stood
up and I had the glass in my hand and I spun round and just – just went for him.
Q. Right. Well, did you have any diﬃculty getting up? – A. Yes.room studies focus in general on cross-examinations, while the accomplishment of friendly examin-
endered as rather unproblematic.
10 T. Scheﬀer / Language & Communication 27 (2007) 1–27Q. Why did you have diﬃculty getting up? – A. Because they were still stamping on
me. I just managed to get up somehow.Q. And at what point did you start to swing the glass? – A. Well, as I got my feet on
the ﬂoor I just spun round and lashed out as I was standing up – at the same time
as I was just standing up. I was like crouched down.The defendant in court refers once again to details such as the glass, the ‘dubious’
blonde guy, the exchange of words prior to the blow, the single blow etc. In fact, in the
duet of defence barrister and defendant, a reiteration of the early account is created. This
quality as reiteration, however, can only be accessed by weighing the testimony in court
against the written statement (the interview protocol taken by the police). A close compar-
ison shows that the testimony is more streamlined than the early account, less ambiguous,
and more deﬁnite.
No one in court does obtain the police protocol except the barristers and the pre-
siding judge. No one else in court is able to contrast the testimony with the early
account, not even the jurors. The ﬁeld interview protocol, despite these import
restrictions, seems suﬃcient to trigger binding eﬀects. This becomes apparent at the
end of the friendly examination. The defence barrister’s questions retract problematic
parts of the early account that the defendant has to account for now several months
later:Q. And then you were asked, ‘‘Did you feel remorse for what you had done, or
anything?’’, and you say, ‘‘No, I wasn’t ﬁnished’’. What did you mean by that?
– A. I don’t know. I was still very angry. I just – I don’t know.Q. And, when you struck with the glass, what did you intend to do? – A.
I don’t know.Q. Did you think about the fact that you had the glass in your hand? – A. No.
Q. Did you want to cause him really serious injury? – A. Not really serious injury, no.The defendant gains an opportunity for repair in front of judge and jury. The questions
by the defence barrister anticipate the knowledge of the counterpart and the foreseeable
course of the cross-examination. Undoubtedly, the prosecuting barrister would use the
weakest link of the early account to provoke revealing replies by the defendant. Undoubt-
edly, any prosecuting barrister would utilise the comments that the defendant (as the sus-
pect) gave to the police months ago:PC You’ve hit him intensively on the side of the head, obviously it creates a wound.
When you did it, did you see the fact you’d cut him?Striker YEH.
PC Did it start bleed straight away?
Striker YEH.
PC Did you feel any remorse for what you’d done or anything?
Striker NO, I WASN’T FINISHED.
PC That would you have done to him?
Striker I DON’T KNOW
T. Scheﬀer / Language & Communication 27 (2007) 1–27 11PC continues to recap the interview.
PC18 Accord
the accuse
questioned
according
refusal to
answered cI take it from talking to you, you’re not sorry for what you’ve done, are you?
Striker NO.
PC I take it as far as you’re concerned he deserved it?
Striker YEH.
PC I have to say you seem almost quite proud of what you have done. Are you
proud of what you’ve done?
Striker NO, NOT PROUD ABOUT IT. I’M JUST NOT FEELING BAD ABOUT IT
NEITHER.2.2. The 2nd case: the early defence as an obstacleIn a case of indecent assault, the ﬁrst defence appears once again in the police interview.
The suspect, like the vast majority of suspects, does not exercise the (restricted) ‘‘right to
silence’’.18 He tries to defend himself against the allegations uttered by the two interview-
ing oﬃcers. This early account reappears months later in court, here during the sentencing
hearing. The two counsels agreed on a ‘basis of the plea’. They ﬁxed their agreement by
delimiting the police protocol to ‘‘page 5’’ (out of 8). The agreed-upon version reads like
this:BLUEd
t. . . JUST SNOGGED WITH HER, JUST PLAYED WITH HER BREASTS,
AS FAR AS I KNOW THAT’ ALL I DID, THEN I GOT UP AND SHE
SAID YOU HAD BETTER GO AND I JUST APOLOGISED, I JUST SAID
SORRY, I SAID YOU WONT SAY OWT TO JANE WILL YOUDC So you’d started kissing with her, did she resist that?
BLUE SHE DID AT FIRST AND THEN SHE JUST RELAXED AFTERWARDS
DC Is that because you told her to relax?
BLUE NO I DIDN’T SAY, CAN’T REMEMBER SAYING THAT
DC Right so you’ve been kissing with her and she’s told you to go and you’ve
carried on kissing with her, was that with consent or without?
BLUE WITHOUT I SHOULD THINK – ALL I CAN DO IS REMEMBER JUST
CUDDLING UP TO HER AND JUST TOUCHING HER BREASTS
DC Is this outside her clothing or inside her pyjamas?
BLUE INSIDE I THINK
DC And what was she saying while you were doing this?
BLUE SHE JUST SAID YOU HAD BETTER GOing to the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994, p. 34 ‘‘the court or jury, in determining whether
is guilty of the oﬀence charged, may draw (. . .) inferences from the failure’’ to ‘‘mention when so
, charged or informed as appear proper’’ (Blackstone’s, 1998, F 19.4, p. 2223). After this legislation,
o Bucke and Brown (1997, chapter 4), refusals to answer all questions decreased from 10% to 6%. The
answer some questions decreased from 13% to 10%. In 84% of the interviews all questions were
ompared to 77% in the pre-1994 act group.
12 T. Scheﬀer / Language & Communication 27 (2007) 1–27How many of the suspect’s answers survived this agreement and how much is cut oﬀ?19How much remains unsaid in the light of the police interview and how much is quoted
directly from the document? What price does each party pay for the ‘‘bargain of the
facts’’? Here, the reappearances of the account during the pre-trial may give some
orientation.
The early account emerged during the police interview by confronting the suspect
‘freely’ with some allegations put forward by the complainant. She reported in an inter-
view some weeks earlier how Tim Blue entered her bedroom, how he started kissing
and stroking her, how he went even further and made her ‘‘do things’’. These allegations
are brought up again to confront the suspect with ’what really happened’ – and to stabilise
the allegations:DC19 Plea bar
criminal just
similar case
sexually pen
victim’s brea. . . She then says that you undid your trouser zip and your belt?
BLUE NO – I CAN’T REMEMBER DOING THAT
DC And that you then took hold of her left wrist and pulled her hand and
put it down your trousers and inside your underpants and made her touch
your erect penis?BLUE NO – I CAN’T REMEMBER DOING THAT
DC And you then put your hand down her shorts and began to touch her vaginal
area, do you remember that?
BLUE NO, NO, BUT I CAN’T REMEMBER THAT BIT. I CAN REMEMBER
GOING OUT THE DOOR BUT I CAN’T REMEMBER TAKING MY
GLASS BACKInstead of oﬀering an alternative account of what happened, the interviewee’s answers
remain vague. They leave room for speculations. The precise and detailed story by the
alleged victim developed into the hegemonic version. As such, it started circulating as
the prosecution case.
The degree of admitted guilt changes from one conference with the client to the next.
The client, internally, stated a whole range of versions: from an optimistic ‘nothing really
happened’ to a realistic (in light of the procedure) ‘I did not go that far’. Rumours circu-
lated about the determination of the ‘victim’ to actually serve as a witness. (She was
embarrassed, ﬁle notes reported.) The solicitor undertook inquiries into her sexual life,
her former relationships, or the activities she undertook the following days after the inci-
dent. The ﬁle analysis revealed the following entries regarding some inquiries into her fam-
ily background:gaining is widely criticised for its uncontrollable results. See the critique of the US system as ‘a
ice system completely given over to plea bargaining’ (Pizzi, 1999, p. 184). He seems to refer to a
to the one presented here: ‘One ﬁnds rape cases in which, as police reports make clear, the defendant
etrated the victim, being pled down to ‘unconsented touching’, as if the defendant simply brushed the
st with his hand.’ (Pizzi, 1999, p. 186 n.)
Case II; Topic No. 12: Family background
Content 16.01 25.01 26.01 23.03 25.04
Dubious
family
background
Meeting
solicitor +
client +
his partner
Check family
history; ask
his partner for
more information
Diary note:
‘What to
do next!’
His partner
mentioned
irregularities
in the . . . More
details?
Letter >
client
Changing partners
of complainant’s
mother
Tel. talk >
his partner
This information
of no great help
for trial
Instruct. to
barrister
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ant’s integrity. Confronted with the hegemonic account, the lack of a counter-version and
a point to attack, the defence work was reduced to cutting back the worst allegations by
means of plea bargaining. The client had to learn the lesson: he could not get rid of his
answers in the police interview.
The admission of guilt changed internally: the account given in the ﬁrst lawyer–client
conferences and the several drafts deriving from here represented the deed as much more
trivial than the accounts that the barrister used to delimit the client’s hopes, to advice the
plea, and to attend the plea bargaining session etc.20 The police protocol, interestingly, was
involved in all these encounters. It animated them, oriented them, and assisted the defence
ensemble to weigh up its case. Bound to his early account, the client turns into its
appendix.
2.3. The 3rd case: the exhaustion of the early defence
The ﬁrst account in this case was more promising. Again pressing questions were asked
by the police. The police interview, however, was only served months later. The defence
could not work with the protocol but with the co-present solicitor’s notes. According to
the solicitor’s report, the police oﬃcer accused her client of having punched a man in front
of his house, throwing stones at him and even attacking him with a knife. Just before the20 This array may manifest what Luhmann (1989) called ‘‘learning’’ mediated by the procedure itself. The parties
start rebuilding their expectations. What can be achieved is measured less in light of the ‘ideal truth’, but in view
of what is feasible under the circumstances.
14 T. Scheﬀer / Language & Communication 27 (2007) 1–27interview, the complainant selected Linda (out of nine) in an identiﬁcation parade. The
police had, consequently, good reasons to choose and prosecute Linda as the prime
suspect.
According to the solicitor’s notes, the police oﬃcer opened the interrogation by asking
the following question: ‘‘Is there anything that you would now like to tell us following that
identiﬁcation parade and following that identiﬁcation?’’ The solicitor reports the following
responses by his client:21
6. I think it was Kim’s sister, who wanted some cigarettes and so we went to get some. I
remember that we went back across the wooden gate it was on our way back to her
mum’s home that we passed a woman and a lad. Kim told me that the woman was
called Lucy and that she was having problems with her.
7. I thought that the lad with Lucy was her boyfriend. He was carrying some shopping.
8. Next to the wooden gate, I remember that there is a sort of stony road. I don’t know
where it leads, as I didn’t go up it.
9. Kim, me and the other girl, who was about 8 stood at the end of the stony road whilst
Lucy and the lad were a bit further up it.
10. Kim and Lucy started to argue. The lad, who I heard was called Andy, dropped his
shopping. He seemed to be aggressive. I did not join in the argument. But stood close
to Kim.
11. I noticed that whilst the argument was going on, a police van was stopped at the end of
the lane . . .
12. I can’t really recall how long the argument lasted. I did not join in and I did not in
anyway threaten Andy or Lucy, or use any form of violence against them.
13. Following the argument, we went straight back to Kim’s mother’s home . . .’’.
(21.1.2001)
The defence (ﬁle) work started from this basis, presupposing that the prosecution side
would come back to these answers. Next, the defence ensemble had to enter an oﬃcial
notice of alibi. Such a notice gives the prosecution the opportunity to counter the alibi
in court, and beforehand, to disclose all material available that refers to it. The deadline
for disclosure ahead, the solicitor intensiﬁed the information ﬂow towards the barrister’s
oﬃce. He handed over a bundle comprising the printed and drafted alibi-story next to the
copied oﬃcial indictment and the self-made summary of the police interview. In the
instructions, the solicitor promoted Kim’s account as ‘‘the core of our case’’. Would the
barrister consent to this high ranking? Two weeks before the notice of alibi was to be dis-
closed, the solicitor wrote in his instructions to barrister:21 Th
beforeShe was interviewed at X-village Police Station in the presence of X from instructing
Solicitors. She conﬁrmed that she had been in x-village and met her friend Kim and
that they had been to Kim’s house and they then went out with her little sister to buy
some cigarettes. She stated that they came across a male and female and an argument
ensued between that male and female and Kim and her sister. She stated that the
male involved took an aggressive stance. She denied that there had been any violencee ﬁrst ﬁve points of the solicitor’s notes deal with the story on what the two friends – Linda and Kim – did
they met Andy who is the complainant and who is going to be the ﬁrst prosecution witness.
T. Scheﬀer / Language & Communication 27 (2007) 1–27 15whatsoever between her and the male. She believed the male to be called Andy and
Counsel will have noted the aggrieved in this allegation is Andy Colin who on the
10th November was staying with his sister who lives at 13 Kings Street, x-village.
That is on the main Counsel housing estate in x-village and our client has indicated
she would not go onto that estate willingly because she has an ex-boyfriend who lives
on the estate and would not wish to bump into him. (28.3.2001)What happened here? The correspondence did not just strive to deliver necessary infor-
mation. The letter, furthermore, took the chance to test the story in a protected and
friendly environment. Consequently, the solicitor highlights functions and relevancies of
the account. For instance, he points out that the aggressive male in Linda’s version is iden-
tical with the aggrieved.
Through the instructed account, solicitor and barrister manage to synchronize their
views on the case. The instructions allowed the lawyers to refer to and work on a shared
object within a protected sphere. Solicitor and barrister could, on this basis, deliberate
strategic (the positioning of the story in the case) as well as tactical questions (the steps
to strengthen the story). Once chosen as being at the heart of the case, the story imposed
some practical steps to take. The barrister receives the following report:We have asked our client whether she can provide us with any information that
might assist us in tracing Kim to see if she was prepared to give a statement. We
appreciate her assistance is perhaps unlikely, but in any event client has not provided
any information which could lead to tracing her. (28.3.2001)Three months later and without any such witness recruited, the account turns into the
oﬃcial ‘‘defence case’’. It provides the basis for the defence statement disclosed to the
prosecution and the court to trigger the secondary disclosure:The defendant states that this would be about 15 minutes after they had left the
house to buy the cigarettes. They came across these people having just crossed a
wooden gate on the way back to X-Street. The Defendant did not know the other
two people until Kim informed her that the woman was called Lucy.The Defendant
thought Lucy was with her boyfriend, but now believes the other male present to
have been the complainant. An argument ensued between Kim and Lucy and the
male adopted an aggressive stance. She believed the male to be called Andy. The
Defendant did not take part in the argument, but stood close by. (13.4.2001)Once announced as an alibi, the account called for further evidence: the alibi witness.
Linda’s account needed the support of the ‘friend’ who accompanied her. Would Kim con-
ﬁrm the account? The secondary disclosure delivered some surprising evidence: Kim, when
initially interviewed by the police as the prime suspect, heavily incriminated ‘our client’.
The defence seemed trapped: it was bound to the repetitively stated alibi and at the same
time exposed by the only alibi witness. The only plus: Kim’s evidence was not admissible in
court since she was at that point interviewed and pressurized as a suspect.
3. Modes of transformation
The three stories suggest new answers to our leading question: How are utterances
turned into statements? It matters, ﬁrst of all, where and when something is uttered in
16 T. Scheﬀer / Language & Communication 27 (2007) 1–27the procedural course. In other words, not every communication enters and matters as
procedural history. It makes a diﬀerence whether Kim, in the third story, delivers her alibi
in the witness box, at the police, or in the law ﬁrm. Or think of Steve Striker in the ﬁrst
story: What happened to his answer ‘‘I was not ﬁnished yet’’ given to the police oﬃcer?
What would have happened if the jury received the same answer simply via the protocol?
Or take the second story: How was it possible to cut back the police protocol that repre-
sented Tim Blue’s account of what happened that night in his (former) friend’s bedroom?22
In the following, I elaborate a range of modes of transformation in accordance with the
three case studies. There are, I argue, three diﬀerent ways and courses to transform utter-
ances into discursive facts. The diﬀerences have their bearing on how the procedural past is
present at a given moment. Only by including all three modes of transformation, the anal-
ysis of legal discourse can explicate how contributions are bound to prior stages. The three
modes alter, generally, the analytical status of the two concepts launched at the outset of
this paper: of the procedural history and of the ﬁeld of presence. This table shall introduce
the three modes of transformation:What is the22 One could expect a sim
explanation by means of S
because its parts emerged in
formation, does not suﬃce
23 The notions remind of th
lecture’’. Despite all simila
Goﬀman’s notion of ‘‘memo
context. The archive is not s
adversary’s assessment of thStagingple explanation in the tem
chu¨tz (1971), who stressed
a diﬀerent order. This idea,
to tackle multiple temporal
e modes of speech-producti
rities, I had to include o
rised speech’’ in order to em
imply a memory that guide
e case in the light of the prReiterationporal order of occurrences. On
that the same (e.g. experience)
however appealing and relevant f
izations.
on as developed by Goﬀman (19
ne important change. The ‘‘ar
phasise the semi-public characte
s the case-representation. At the
ocedural past.MobilisationParadigmatic
situation?Testimony
under oathRepeating a
questionDrafting a
statementSite of
transformation?Public arena Series of
procedural eventsInternal public/
back regionFrom utterance
to statement?A jump/
indistinguishableReferring to
authoritative sourcesComposition of
modulesSupportive
materiality?Courtroom/
speaker’s bodyFile as archive/
protocolsFile as scrapbook/
draftsResulting case
representation?Fresh talk Archival speech Scripted speechStatements do not arise, as Foucault implies, from direct transformations of discursive
events into discursive objects only. They do not arise only by means of an archive that
remembers everything said during the procedure, as Luhmann implies. As the table sug-
gests, the transformation of utterances into statements takes place at diﬀerent sites, in dif-
ferent temporalizations, and with various eﬀects. Depending on the chosen mode, case-
representation is understood diﬀerently. Speech may refer to the very event itself (‘‘fresh
talk’’), to a whole array of related iterations (‘‘archival speech’’), or to rehearsed and coa-
ched performance (‘‘scripted speech’’).23e could work out such
can be diﬀerent simply
or the study of discourse
81) in his article on ‘‘the
chival speech’’ replaces
r of memory in the legal
same time, it equips the
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suggest in the conclusion, entails safeguards that shield the participants from the strong
procedural dynamics.3.1. Staging
The ﬁrst mode is commonly conceived as the major one. The theatrical metaphor is
applied to criminal trials within a wide range of sociolegal approaches.24 These may
explain the absence of the procedure as sociological category together with the widespread
talk-bias in sociolegal studies.25 In the mode of staging, utterances are turned into state-
ments ‘right away’. The immediate transformation makes it impossible to clearly separate
one from the other. The mode of immediacy fosters the impression that utterances were in
fact statements per se. They are, within this mode only, identical with embodied and
staged performances.26
But how is this possible? In order to understand this mode, one has to study the
site of its enactment in detail: the court. The court provides the deﬁned arena for the
cases to materialise. The court deﬁnes speech positions, the focus of attention, and the
relevant audience. It grants a voice to the few and excludes the noise of the many. It
introduces a multiplicity and hierarchy of participants: bystanders in the public
gallery, mobile service personnel on the site, seated assistants (clerk, recorder) in the
centre, appointed decision-makers (judge, jury) in prominent ranks, competent ‘asking’
in-court-lawyers (barristers) in the inner circle, and the called and ‘answering’ contrib-
utors (witnesses) in the stand. The court frames a centred but complex social
situation.2724 This is true especially for critical approaches: see Carlen (1976, p. 18 nn.), who deﬁnes theatrical as the
merging of ‘‘mundane and puzzling’’ eﬀects of the setting; see Pizzi (1998, p. 125), who ascribes an extreme
theatrical attitude especially to American trial lawyers and their witnesses: ‘Witnesses are not just witnesses in our
system: they are performers who need to be coached to give their best performance from the point of view of the
lawyer calling the witness.’ For an example of rather applied literature using the theatre metaphor, see Ball (2003).
25 See amongst others Atkinson and Drew (1979), Drew (1990, 1992), or Matoesian (1993).
26 In 2004 the Journal of Empirical Legal Studies published a debate on the phenomenon of ‘‘vanishing trials’’,
which was foremost observed as statistical terms. For Friedman (2004, p. 699 n.), the drop in trial ﬁgures is ‘a sign
of the diminished role of legal process as theatre. There is nothing theatrical about depositions and discovery
process. Nothing is more boring than an anti-trust case. The big criminal trial – the show trial, the Lizzie Borden
case, or O.J. Simpson in the dock – is the chief survivor of the theatrical element in the law. The public, didactic
elements have otherwise vanished. . . . In fact, this was one of the functions of the courts: they were institutions
that had the job of making public various facts, events, and the situations.’
27 Carlen (1976) commented on the Magistrates Court in a rather narrow, critical perspective. How, she asks, is
‘‘spatial dominance achieved’’? Some answers would ﬁt as well to the Crown Court: ‘Spatial dominance is
achieved by structural elevation, and the magistrates sits raised up from the rest of the court.’ (23) Or by means of
distances that ‘are certainly greater than those usually and voluntarily chosen for disclosure of intimate details of
sexual habits, personal relationships, and ﬁnancial aﬀairs.’ (Carlen, 1976) Rock (1993) analyses the divide which
exists between professional insiders and public outsiders and provides some details of how this division is built
into the court architecture.
18 T. Scheﬀer / Language & Communication 27 (2007) 1–27The Crown Court is a discourse automat.28 The court demarcates who speaks when, to
whom, from where, etc. The speech exchanges are governed by observable traﬃc rules.
Some of these rules: witnesses do not talk to the jury directly. They answer the barristers’
questions. Only from the witness box and as a witness, one is permitted to address the
court.29 The jury is supposed to receive the cases solely from inside court, meaning from
the exchanges between barrister and witness and from the closing speeches. All these rules
are in place independent from the cases, issues, participants, etc. This is true not despite
but because of strictly deﬁned exceptions.30 The general frame processes countless cases
and remains in place as the same. The general automat is inevitably co-enacted as factual
and proper while conducting the hearing. The automat constitutes ‘‘framed interactions’’
(Latour, 1996) for all practical purposes. It may well be called a ‘‘political machine’’
(Barry, 2001) that ritualises and standardises proximity.
The traﬃc rules introduce an alien kind of interaction: everything seems slower,
repeated, explicated, explained, etc.31 The resulting rule-bound performance makes it,
interestingly enough, easier to follow the matters than a pub talk or a table talk. How does
this automat contribute to the many hearings passing it? The courtroom displays a centre
of attention; the positioning of voices does signify deﬁned relevancies (such as being in the
stand, on the dock, on the bench); the automat eases the reception of the dealings (for the28 The idea of discourse automat links our study closely to the scientiﬁc experiment, designed to create
standardised observation on controlled changes. Some scholars in the history of science could show similarities
between the courtroom and the laboratories in early modernism. See Shapin (1994) or Shapiro (1991).
29 See Langbein (2003) on how the ‘‘accused became silenced’’, while the trial hearing became dominated by
professional lawyers.
30 See the Criminal Justice Act 1988, p. 32 (Blackstone’s, 1998, appendix 1). In a number of exceptional cases,
witnesses may be permitted by the court to give evidence using a ‘‘television link’’. Other variations may refer to
the atmosphere in court (relaxing the dressing code to suite young oﬀenders) or to safeguards to protect a witness
(by dividing screens). The court can sit ‘‘in camera’’, meaning the public can be excluded from the trial (see
Blackstone’s, 1998: D 2.48). See Matoesian (1993) for exceptions granted to vulnerable witnesses.
31 This becomes apparent in the practices to deliver some extra information from the defendant to the judge via
ﬁrst the assistant, second the solicitor, and third the barrister. This Chinese Whisper is necessary because the
defendant is not allowed to address the judge directly.
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related discourse-ethical deliberations (the set-up is generally agreed upon). The inﬂexibil-
ity facilitates the immediate and pertinent discoursivation. Only here, embodied utterances
are turned into discursive facts right away.
One point is often forgotten and important for our concern of discursive transforma-
tion: the automat is not only crucial as a general format. It gives room for stable expec-
tations as well. It enables preparation and provides an orientation point to weigh the
cases during the plea bargaining. The court provides a stable frame of orientation for both,
the defending and the prosecuting party. This is how a potentially disastrous utterance
(‘‘I’m just not feeling bad about it!’’) can be ‘disarmed’ (1st case). This is how a weak
defence (2nd case) can be measured in advance. This is how future demands (3rd case)
can be anticipated.
3.2. Reiteration
Reiteration involves various sites, moments, and media. It is enabled by a series of pro-
cedural events and by a range of communicative formats. Reiteration stabilises issues
already prior to the trial hearing and, thus, enables the ‘premature’ measuring and balanc-
ing of cases in the procedural course. In the three micro-histories, we ﬁnd the repetitive
concern of ‘what really happened’ at diﬀerent sites and in diﬀerent forms: in the police
interview, in the written police protocol, in the circulating copies, in the quoting letters
and conversations, in the friendly and hostile witness examinations, and in the closing
speeches. The series is even more composite and speciﬁc. An issue is already repeated in
the course of just the interview. The same is true for the court hearing: the same questions
are asked various times to various witnesses in order to produce repetition and (observa-
ble) diﬀerences.
Reiteration can be understood as a clever move by the interrogator. It can be studied as
meticulously prearranged. However, reiteration is ﬁrst of all a procedural accomplishment.
Only the standard series of events and exchanges allows reiteration to take place at all.
Accordingly, we ﬁnd arrays of events where somebody is expected to speak out ‘again’,
to deliver his ‘identical’ defence, and to announce what was already known. Reiteration
is organised by:
 Archived and disclosed evidence. During the police inquiries, interview protocols are col-
lected and analyzed. They serve as contrasts for the reception of statements in court.
 Questionnaires by the court. The adversaries are asked to provide information on the
probable defence, the likely witnesses to be called, or the facts in debate.
 Linkages of procedural rights and obligations. For instance, in order to activate secondary
disclosure, the defence has to enter a ‘‘defence statement’’ containing the line of defence.
 Series of administrative pre-trial hearings. The hearings are recorded and ﬁled. They are
set to confront the parties on early stages and to facilitate resolutions outside of court.32 So does the dressing code. The Lord Chancellor only recently clariﬁed the ‘the requirements of Practice
Direction (Court Dress) [1994] 1 W.L.R. 1056 of 19 July 1994’: ‘Queen’s Counsel wear a short wig and silk (or
stuﬀ) gown over a court coat; junior counsel wear a short wig and stuﬀ gown with bands; solicitors and other
advocates authorised under the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 (Blackstone’s, 1998, p. 1039) wear a black
stuﬀ gown and bands, but no wig.’
20 T. Scheﬀer / Language & Communication 27 (2007) 1–27Analysing reiteration means to include the entire line of preliminary, archived sessions,
which furnish any later occasion with contrasting versions. The participants conduct these
sessions on the basis of what is already known. There seems no start from scratch. There is
always already a version in place that an answer can be contrasted against and that an
answer has to take into account.33
However, not every reappearance of an issue carries the same weight and binding eﬀect.
Important is the variation of binding to invite ‘ﬁrst entries’. Accordingly, there are some
announcements that are just guesswork (in the court’s questionnaire); some declarations
oﬃcially deﬁne the case for now (the defence statement); others set-up the frame of repre-
sentation for the plea bargaining session and the trial hearing (the solicitor’s brief for the
barrister). No matter the variation of binding, the reappearances will add to some kind of
stabilising function. Something ‘naturally’ turns into the oﬃcial position that any follow-
ing representation will have to account for.
The procedural conditions for reiteration become apparent when tracing the police pro-
tocol (PP) of the questioning through the pre-trial and trial. The PP reappears at diﬀerent
junctions, in various regions, and to diﬀerent audiences. Its trajectories criss-cross the dis-
cursive zones of the two adversaries and the Court:
Defence Court  Prosecution / Police 
Def. barrister instructed 
by solicitor 
PP used by barrister to
interview defendant
- Cross examination vis-à-
vis judge/jury in light of 
PP
- Friendly examination 
vis-à-vis judge/jury by 
help of PP
- Closing speech by judge 
Pros. barrister instructed 
by CPS 
PP used by barrister to
interview ‘victim’ 
PP used by solicitor to
instruct barrister
PP used by solicitor to
interview client
PP used by judge to
prepare for the trial 
hearing
PP used by sol. to instruct
barrister
PP used by sol. to
interview other witnesses 
 PP received as part of 
disclosed bundle
PP received by the court
as part of the disclosed 
bundle
[Account used to present
the matter in Magistrates 
Court] 
PP disclosed to
defence/court by 
“disclosure officer” 
Account written down in
police protocol (PP) 
Account noted by the 
solicitor
Early account in the 
police interview 
The police protocol circulates horizontally from the prosecution to the defence, often
after some delay. The PP circulates vertically from the police to the CPS and from there33 Pizzi (1999, p. 124) identiﬁes and praises this mode of discoursivation for the European jurisdictions: ‘If a
defendant has oﬀered two diﬀerent accounts of what happened on the evening of the crime, the judges will know
that and will take the inconsistency into account.’ In the US regimes, this mechanism is undermined by too many
protections in favour of the defendant. Pizzi gives an example that reminds of our 3rd case: ‘(. . .) if the defendant
decides to withdraw the alibi and oﬀer a completely diﬀerent defence at trial, the prosecution can’t cross-examine
him or point out to the jury that this is now the second of two inconsistent defences that the defendant put
forward.’ Pizzi (1999, p. 123)
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the judge. The circulations serve the legal contest that should be fair and truthful and a
temporal and functional division of labour that should be eﬃcient and reliable.
Due to reiteration, giving evidence in court turns into a strange event. The interviewee
answers questions that he/she already answered elsewhere;34 the interviewer asks questions
to which he/she knows already the answers. Reiteration provides a powerful procedural
mechanism, which is, however, limited in some respects. Earlier questions and answers
are not fully available in court. Practical restrictions are pertinent here:
(a) Before documents are used in court, the barristers conduct some close reading in
order to prevent inadmissible parts from being put to the jury. Inadmissible are, gen-
erally speaking, inferences that can not be tested in court such as hearsay or
assumptions.
(b) Due to the principle of orality, the jury receives evidence from the friendly and hos-
tile examinations only. Documents are not distributed on paper. Exceptionally,
meaning once they are called as evidence, documents can be read out.35 The author-
itative source is kept away from the jurors in order to promote a fresh reception.36
The import restrictions interrupt the free circulation of past contributions. In court, it
takes a further translation – this time back into spoken words – for the interplay of ‘rep-
etition and diﬀerence’ to be prolonged.
3.3. Mobilisation
The analysis of legal discourse usually pays attention to facets of staging and reitera-
tion: on staged speech exchange and on strategic documentary interrogation. The mobili-
sation by means of ﬁle work (Scheﬀer, 2003), in contrast, remains rather unexplored. The
three cases above reported on a whole range of mobilising work on the back stage of the
procedure. Witnesses are recruited, statements drafted, ideas tested, tactics changed, pleas34 This is the basis to qualify ‘good witnesses’ and ‘good clients’. As the solicitor in the 1st case told me: ‘‘It is
always helpful to the defences, or any defence that the client gives a version of events to police when he’s charged
and interviewed on tape that he basically sticks with throughout the case. If he says something in interview and
then changes it when he comes to see us a week later, or when he goes to Crown Court 2 months later, the
inconsistency is no great.’’
35 The governmental Auld Report discussed this restriction: ‘But it is common place for juries, having retired to
consider their verdict, to return to court to ask the judge to be reminded of what a witness has said and, often, for
a copy of his written statement. In most instances they know that there is such a statement because the advocates
and the judge were plainly following their copies of it as he gave his evidence, the witness may have referred to it,
or the advocates have cross-examined and reexamined him by reference to it. All the leading players in the
courtroom have one, but not the jury.’ (2001, p. 520) Lord Justice Auld defended this rule: ‘(. . .) even with a
proper warning and further reminder by the judge of the witness’s oral evidence, they [the jurors] would be likely
to give the statement more weight than their recollection of what he said.’ (ibid.)
36 This is the case for other ‘misleading inﬂuences’ as well. The jury is kept in separation from public comments,
from media coverage, or from the neighbours’ opinion. The court, it seems, mistrusts the ‘credulous’ jurors.
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the protected sphere of the client–lawyer relationship and of the conﬁdential defence ﬁle.37
This mode of discoursivation has various consequences for our understanding of ﬁles
and ﬁle work. Crucial transformations take place in the lawyer’s interaction with the ﬁle.
Here we ﬁnd practical eﬀorts to recruit an alibi witness (3rd case), to limit the extent of the
early admission (2nd case), or to prepare excuses for the early slips (1st case). In this mode,
the defence ﬁle is not used primarily as an archive, but rather as a scrapbook that provides
a wide range of valuable entries: speculations, ideas, plans, projects, to-do-lists, drafts, etc.
The scrapbook is the launch pad for multiple becomings to be mobilised and assembled. It
hosts and facilitates the careers of legal arguments.38
The ﬁle’s inscriptions do not obtain authority the way archival records do. They do not
constitute relations between something original and something copied. The scrapbook
rather relates ‘in time’ something imperfect, not ﬁnished, and unstable to something tested,
completed, and presentable. It constitutes an ongoing writing process that is completed
only once a piece is irreversibly published. The archive, in contrast, emphasises the inde-
pendence and the authority of the document. The scrapbook-ﬁle is a quarry to work with
(rather than to study or interpret), while the archive-ﬁle hosts rigid and closed documents
(to refer to, or to quote).
The mode of mobilisation diﬀers from the two models introduced above: Luhmann’s
concept of the procedural history, for instance, consults by and large the archival form.
Everything uttered is recorded and potentially exhibits binding eﬀects. The defence ﬁle,
in contrast, emphasises the reversal nature of statement-becomings that are ‘in construc-
tion’ on the backstage of the procedure. Foucault’s formation misses mobilisation because
it oﬀers no place for becomings. Everything is already part of a discourse and underlies its
dynamics, forces, and laws. Mobilisation, in contrast, highlights the temporary unavail-
ability and protection. Something is not yet part of the discourse.
The defence ﬁle is the device by which the case worker accumulates points not only for
the day in court, but for the series of procedural events that demand for positions and
decisions. The defence ﬁle is the instrument, with which the solicitor methodically develops
a case, reassesses its potentials, identiﬁes its weaknesses, and tries to overcome them. The
ﬁle is the basis of ‘‘impression control’’,39 in so far as legal arguments can be guided step-
wise into the procedural limelight.4037 One solicitor explained to me the distinction of the oﬃcial defence statement and the statement taken in the
law ﬁrm: ‘‘The longer statement of which this is the handwritten amendment to is kept in our ﬁle and sent to his
barrister for the purpose of giving evidence before the Crown Court jury. But the defence statement – to
distinguish between them – that we could say is a witness statement, is his formal witness statement. Whereas the
defence statement is the shorter one that just has basically the relevant bits narrowed down, sent to the Crown –
trying not to give too much away . . .’’
38 The career metaphor is widely used in ethnographic studies. See Meehan (2000) on police statistics or Limoges
et al. (1991) on political drafting. See for the practice of legal discourse (Scheﬀer, 2004, 2005a).
39 For new developments to increase impression control see Kressel and Kressel (2002).
40 Most of the ﬁle’s content and most of the work that went into it remain unvoiced. See Star and Strauss (1999)
for the distribution of voices in work processes.
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domicile of the evolving case. It is the centre of calculation41 for the defence ensemble.
From here, members are supplied with suggestions, instructions, and information.42 The
ﬁle creates an internal public, from which contributions are distributed to speciﬁc address-
ees and publics. The pre-trial correspondence is, in this line, the integrating factor of the
adversarial procedure. The parties, in the course of their exchanges, deﬁne the grounds for
shared as well as debated issues. And they are enabled to do so due to the backstage that is
conceded by rules of conﬁdentiality.
Mobilisation represents procedural protectionism that is commonly undervalued in
sociolegal research. The shielded mobilisation does not replace but rather moderates the
two other modes of discoursivation. But mobilisation is not simply driven by protection.
It takes place under time pressure, in anticipation of the upcoming events, and on the
grounds of the disclosed facts. It is heavily occupied with staging and reiteration.
4. Conclusion
How are utterances turned into discursive facts? This seemingly simple question
revealed quite a complex picture of legal discourses. Legal discourses are not plain, trans-
parent, and monological units. Instead, they unfold as decentred formations that are inter-
nally diﬀerentiated and divided.43 There is no position from which legal procedures are
fully accessible. There are, rather, multiple socio-logics in diﬀerent time-spaces at work:
a number of modes of discoursivation. I presented three modes, which I believed are most
pertinent for English Crown Court cases: the ritualistic staging, the organised reiteration,
and the shielded mobilisation.
But is it enough to just enumerate these modes and to identify their workings? Is it
enough to specify comprehensive discourse models such as Luhmann’s ‘‘procedural past’’
and Foucault’s ‘‘formation’’? After I analysed three consequential modes of discoursiva-
tion, it seems necessary to link them together. The modes clearly do not appear in isola-
tion. The modes, furthermore, seem to appear in a hierarchy. Simply put, they are
combined and ordered. The way this ordering emerges is, however, not easily grasped.41 For Latour (1987, p. 223) ‘‘centres of calculation’’ are essential for acting at a distance: ‘. . . how to act at a
distance on unfamiliar events, places and people? Answer: by somehow bring home these events, places and
people. How can this be achieved, since they are distinct? By inventing means that (a) render them mobile so that
they can be brought back; (b) keep them stable so that they can be moved back and forth without additional
distortion, corruption or decay, and (c) are combinable so that whatever stuﬀ they are made of, they can be
cumulated, aggregated or shuﬄed like a pack of cards.’
42 This only within limits: the barrister, according to the Code of Conduct for the Bar of England and Wales,
must not ‘rehearse, practice or coach a witness in relation to his evidence or the way in which he should give it.’
(Section 607 (b), Blackstone’s, 1998, p. 2262) Before this, any contact between barrister and witness prior to the
trial was rendered unethical. To my knowledge, barristers rarely meet witnesses prior. It is the solicitor’s task to
obtain a written testimony prior to the trial. See Tague (1996) for the division of labour between barrister and
solicitor and for the numerous problems that arise from it.
43 As Pizzi (1999, p. 122) shows for the US, the lack of transparency becomes an issue within the legal discourse
itself: ‘‘(. . .) arguments may carry over into the trial with one side or the other claiming that it did not receive the
proper information from the advocate on the other side prior to trial and that therefore (1) the court ought not to
permit certain information to be presented at trial, or (2) the jury should be told of this failing by the other side, or
(3) the judge should grant continuance to permit the ‘surprised’ lawyer time to better prepare to examine the
‘surprise’ witness, and so on.’’
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discoursivation.
One pattern seems evident. The modes work in pairs. What is meant by this? Witnesses
are invited to give a fresh view on ‘‘what really happened’’ in the stand, while at the same
time they are assessed in light of former versions. The defence ensemble prepares its case in
the protected sphere of the law ﬁrm while being forced to anticipate the upcoming trial
hearing. Reiteration provides materials for the mobilisation of statements and, hence,
binds even the internal aﬀairs to the procedural history. But to what eﬀects do these pairs
work? They create, I suggest, a mix of pull-factors and push-factors, a mix of invitation
and obligation, of promise and threat.
The duplicity of event and process, of truth-telling and fact-confrontation, of orality
and inscriptions, of proximity and history is highly proliﬁc. It makes people speak of what
cannot be expressed. It makes people write of what cannot be actualised. It creates a con-
stant deﬁcit that is ﬁlled with more of the same. As a result, procedures ﬁll ﬁles, meetings,
and hearings with an overload of discursive facts of ﬁrst order (‘‘Then I went to . . .!’’) and
second order (‘‘But before you claimed . . .!’’). They amass hints, contrasts, and clues that
eventually turn the non-decidable into something decidable. The legal discourse provides
countless ‘internal’ resources to take a decision on something that generally cannot be
decided: the irreversible past.
Is this the way in which Luhmann imagined the legal procedure to be so forceful? Is this
the mechanism that made Foucault’s ‘‘I’’ hesitate before entering the ﬁeld of presence?44
Duplicity, it seems, traps people in their own choices. It twists around utterances and aims
them against their authors. But is the procedure well grasped as a trickster? Is it well
described as a double play that invites and undermines ‘naı¨ve’ contributions?
Such a characterisation would, indeed, lead right back to where we started. Luhmann
and Foucault emphasised the threats that go along with systematic discourses. Speakers
who enter the discourse full of hope and aspiration quite likely leave it disappointed
and thwarted. While both theorists seem clear about the immense powers of transforma-
tive communication,45 they seem to disregard the regulations that protect participants (as
authors) from their own words. Suspects are warned, allowed to remain silent, or freed
from their illegitimate pasts. Witnesses are protected from misleading questions, from gos-
sip, false burden, or undue standards of truth. The one charged is granted the right to
remain silent, is approved time to prepare the case, is provided with legal advice and rep-
resentation, and is guaranteed several (minimal) standards (and legitimate expectations) to
rely on.
These protections, one may criticise from the point of view of procedural sway, are not
suﬃcient to counter the procedural powers. They may not be suﬃcient to reinforce the
shattered ‘‘impression management’’ (Goﬀman, 1959, pp. 208–212) of those held account-44 ‘Inclination speaks out: ‘‘I don’t want to have to enter this risky world of discourse; I want nothing to do with
it insofar as it is decisive and ﬁnal (. . .)’’ Institutions reply: ‘‘But you have nothing to fear from launching out;
we’re here to show your discourse is within the established order of things, that we’ve waited a long time for its
arrival (. . .)’’’ (Foucault, 1971, p. 7).
45 None of which is mentioned in the book by Conley and O’Barr (1998) on legal discourse. There is, generally
speaking, a lack of approaches that take the materiality of communication into account. Relevance arises not
simply from exchanges in diﬀerent legal contexts, but from the spatiotemporal transformations attached to them.
See Tuitt (2005).
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yers, misleading information, overregulated hearings, etc. Because of the protections, par-
ticipants may be bound even tighter to the carefully mobilised version. Within the concept
of procedural supremacy, protections can easily be turned into ‘slippery’ ingredients whose
only function is to create free and binding choices. Again, are the protections nothing but
resources that add to the procedural supremacy?
In light of the modes of discoursivation and in light of the manifold ruptures, I hesitate
to ascribe one single rationale to the procedural regime. Perhaps, the regime’s power is as
little centred as the related discourse formation itself. The regime presented here, I con-
clude, does not follow one monological order. It can not be reduced to a single raison
d’eˆtre. This does not exclude but rather promotes discursive unity. The three modes, in
changing combinations, provide the legal procedure with discursive facts that turn ‘all
these problems’ into one determinable matter.References
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